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This selective review combines cognitive models and biolog-
ical models of psychosis into a tentative integrated neuro-
psychiatric model. The aim of the model is to understand
better, how pharmacotherapy and cognitive-behavior ther-
apy come forward as partners in the treatment of psychosis
and play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles.
The article reviews the dominant models in literature.
The focus in this review is on one hand on neural circuits
that are involved in cognitive models and on the other hand
on cognitive processes and experiences involved in biolog-
ical models. In this way, a 4-component neuropsychiatric
model is tentatively constructed: (1) a biological component
that leads to aberrant perceptions and salience of stimuli,
(2) a cognitive component that attempts to explain the psy-
chic abnormal events, (3) a mediating component with psy-
chological biases which influences the reasoning process in
the direction of the formation of (secondary) delusions, and
(4) a component of psychological processes that maintains
delusions and prevents the falsification of delusional ideas.
Remission consists actually of 2 processes. Biological re-
mission consists of the dampening of mesolimbic dopamine
releases with antipsychotic medication and decreases the
continuous salient experiences. Psychological remission
consists of the reappraisal of primary psychotic experien-
ces. Both forms of remission are partially independent. We
expect that a full remission including biological and psy-
chological remission could prevent relapse.
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Introduction
Schizophrenia is characterized by 3 symptom syndromes:
positive, disorganization, and negative symptoms.1 The
development of (neuro)cognitive and structural models
on disorganization and negative symptoms is just start-
ing. Recent research on positive symptoms such as delu-
sions and hallucinations has progressed markedly, and
models are developed and tested. The evidence shows
that psychosis is best understood with a neuropsychiatric
model that integrates heredity, vulnerability, social ad-
versities, and cognitive appraisal processes. The stages
of development of psychosis are based on a neurodevelop-
mental vulnerability that is partly of an hereditary nature
and partly result of early environmental influences. Social
adversities later in life such as migration or cannabis
abuse, propel the individual into a state of dopamine-
induced perceptual aberrations. Thereafter, cognitive
biases result into delusional interpretation of these ab-
normal perceptual experiences.2–4 The model of psycho-
sis needs to be a neuropsychiatric model. Although there
are cognitive models and biological models of psychosis,
an integrated neuropsychiatric model is still lacking.
This article reviews the dominant models that connect
cognitive models of psychosis with biological models.
The proposed neuropsychiatric model also has clinical
significance because the model links pharmacological
and cognitive-behavioral treatments. The proposed
model can be considered as an extension of cognitive
neuroscience into the domain of psychiatry.5 The model
discriminates biological remission from psychological
recovery of psychotic symptoms and explains the (partly)
different effects of pharmacotherapy and cognitive-
behavior therapy (CBT) on psychosis.
Antipsychotic medication and CBT have an additive ef-
fect in recovering from psychosis. When antipsychotic
medication is insufficiently helpful, CBT can be an effec-
tive add-on therapy inpsychosis.CBT is apsychotherapeu-
tic approach that has proven to be effective in ameliorating
psychotic symptoms in medicated patients.6–9
This selective review of delusions and auditory verbal
hallucinations (AVHs) searched Medline and Psychinfo
on schizophrenia and other psychosis (‘‘schizophrenia’’
OR ‘‘psychosis’’ OR ‘‘delusion’’ OR ‘‘hallucinations’’
OR ‘‘paranoia’’) and different models (‘‘cognitive
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model’’ OR ‘‘neuropsychiatry’’ OR ‘‘neurocognition’’
OR ‘‘neurobiology’’ OR ‘‘attribution’’ OR ‘‘theory of
mind’’ OR ‘‘self-serving bias’’ OR ‘‘selective attention’’
OR ‘‘source monitoring’’ OR ‘‘confirmatory bias’’ OR
‘‘stigma’’). This selection was further limited to articles
on human subjects and review articles. This resulted in
394 articles. The selection of reviewed articles stresses
the links between psychosis and a cognitive model and
the effects on the mind of neurotransmitter dysregula-
tion. Articles that do not address one of the main models
are not discussed in this article.
Biological Processes in Psychosis
Dopamine and Psychosis
Dopamine is a neurotransmitter that is central to psycho-
sis. Although other neurotransmitter systems do play
a role in psychoses, dopamine is associated with the
primary perceptual aberrations, delusions, and negative
symptoms, while for instance, serotonin is associatedwith
depression in psychosis.10 Recent research has been able
to pinpoint some of the brain areas involved in psychosis
with modern imaging techniques such as positron emis-
sion tomography, single positron emission tomography,
and magnetic resonance imaging.11,12 Cognitive dysfunc-
tions are associated to hypodopaminergic function of
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). The mood
symptoms are like depression associated tomedial prefron-
tal cortex (MPFC), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
and the orbitofrontal cortex. Positive symptoms are asso-
ciated with excessive dopamine in the mesolimbic dopa-
mine pathways.13
General Models
Several general models have been proposed for schizo-
phrenia that try to explain schizophrenia symptoms.
One of the earliest models suggests that schizophrenia
is characterized by ‘‘abnormal lateralization.’’14,15 An-
other model is the ‘‘disconnection model.’’ This model
does not just localize the problems in information flow
in the interhemispheric connections but expects a wide-
spread failure of corticocortical and corticosubcortical
connections to be involved in psychosis.16 The ‘‘imbal-
anced brain model’’ stresses the linkage between emotion
processing in the amygdala and cognitive conscious pro-
cessing in prefrontal areas.17 And finally, the ‘‘cognitive
dysmetria model’’ stresses the widespread cognitive fail-
ures in attention, emotion, memory, and executive func-
tions.18 Although there is evidence for all these models,
no conclusive evidence has been found for any of the
comprehensive models.19 Groups of symptoms on a syn-
drome level cannot be put into models at this moment.
Therefore, in this review, we limit ourselves to models
on a symptom level that explain the positive symptoms
of psychosis: delusions and AVHs.
Symptom Models
Delusions. A central role of dopamine is to mediate the
‘‘salience’’ of environmental events and internal represen-
tations. Not all new stimuli that enter the perceptual field
attract conscious attention. This only happens to stimuli
that are novel and that demand a response. Dopamine
gives salience and focuses attention on the stimulus, at-
taches an emotional value, and prepares a response. In
psychosis, dopamine is not only released in reaction
to a stimulus but also at random moments. Random
increases in dopamine release in themesolimbic pathways
lead to abnormal ‘‘gating’’ of information into the pre-
frontal cortex.20 In this way, irrelevant information can
get access to conscious processing as if it concerns impor-
tant information.21
‘‘I noticed things that I had never paid attention to be-
fore .’’ The person tries to make sense of these salient
experiences, and in this way, delusions can result: ‘‘I felt
enormous significance, and suddenly it was clear to me.
All the pieces of the puzzle fell into their place.’’ While
delusions are a cognitive effort by the patient to make
sense of these aberrantly salient experiences, hallucina-
tions reflect a direct experience of the aberrant salience
of internal representations.3 The explanations the patient
gives for the appearance of voices can easily become sec-
ondary delusions on the origin, power, and malevolence
of the voices.
Paranoid patients experience many trivial stimuli as
meaningful: eg, seeing an unknown car with an antenna
in the street may trigger the thought: ‘‘they must be spy-
ing on me through this antenna.’’ This heightened selec-
tive attention for ‘‘threatening’’ stimuli is reflected in
reduced activation of rostral-ventral ACC which is
involved in self-monitoring and increased posterior
cingulate cortex activation which results in impaired
self-reflection.22
There is also evidence that a functional disconnection
characterizes paranoia in autonomic and central systems
for processing threat-related signals. The MPFC regu-
lates the response of the amygdala to acute stressful
stimuli via the nucleus accumbens (NAcc). This overac-
tivation in the amygdala and underactivation of the
MPFC locks the visceral circuit. Inappropriate emotional
reactions continue, and inhibition is impossible. Para-
noid cognition may reflect an internally generated cycle
of misattribution regarding incoming fear signals due to
a breakdown in the regulation of these systems.23
When the mesolimbic pathway that originates in the
ventral tegmental area (VTA) stimulates the NAcc with
phasic dopamine, the hippocampus inputs are facilitated
via D1 receptor activation, which in turn enhances NAcc
activity. As a consequence, ventral pallidus (VP) activity
is suppressed, causing the prefontal cortex (PFC) inputs
to be attenuated. In this way, learning can take place. Per-
severation of learned responses results from mesolimbic
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overstimulation. The PFC is dominant in set switching,
which is necessary to unlearn old responses. The PFC
can only reset the system by a downregulation of tonic
dopamine in the NAcc. In this case, PFC inputs are facil-
itated. As a result, VP activity is further elevated, sup-
pressing tonic firing in VTA dopamine neurons.24,25
Figure 1 shows the networks involved in the paranoid
delusional state. Phasic dopamine and high tonic dopa-
mine result in underactivation of the PFC. In the amygdala
network, this results in persistent inappropriate emotional
reactions to irrelevant stimuli and the inability to second-
ary appraisal of emotional stimuli. The hippocampus net-
work is locked as well. Evaluation of learned responses
lacks, and the patient perseveres in inadequate responses.
Hallucinations. Ameta-analysis has shown that halluci-
nations are in general associated with sensory modality-
specific activation in cerebral areas involved in normal
sensory processing.26 AVHs are associated with activa-
tion in the middle and superior temporal cortex (Wer-
nicke).12,27 Wernicke is involved in processing speech.
The temporal regions are central in AVHs, but other
regions are involved in a network including the inferior
frontal (Broca), PFC, ACC, and primary motor cortex
(PMC). AVHs are considered misattributions of self-
generated speech. Accurate identification of one’s own
speech appears to depend on ACC and PFC activity.28
One explanation of AVHs is that alterations of white
matter fiber tracts lead to abnormal coactivation in
regions related to the acoustical processing of external
stimuli. This abnormal activation may account for the in-
ability to distinguish self-generated thoughts from exter-
nal stimulation.29 A recent study into the temporal course
of AVHs showed activation of left inferior frontal and
right middle temporal gyri (Broca: generation of inner
speech) that preceded the self-report of an AVH. After
6–9 seconds, the bilateral temporal area and the left insu-
la (Wernicke: perception of auditory verbal material)
were activated.30 Voices that are heard from outside in
contrast to voices heard from inside are characterized
by activation of the plenum temporale.31
Figure 2 shows the most important parts of the AVH
network. Broca is involved to produce the inner speech
that is misperceived as not self-generated. Normally,
Wernicke can decide whether the perception is outer gen-
erated (coming from the ear) or inner generated (coming
from Broca) by a corollary discharge to the ACC that
functions as a central monitor. The ACC prepares Wer-
nicke for the perception of self-generated inner speech. In
AVHs, this monitor function fails. The inner speech
reaches the PMC which in turn activates the vocal
chords.32,33 AVHs can be reduced by auditory input or
by activating the speech-generating areas.34 Reducing
the input by wearing an ear plug has also been found
to reduce AVHs.35 Failure in the monitor loop seems
to be a prerequisite for AVH, but the increased connec-
tivity between Broca and Wernicke29 can easily enhance
AVH (H. Smid and A. Aleman, unpublished data, 2006).
As sporadic instances of AVHs are quite common
among the general population,36–38 especially in condi-
tions of sensory deprivation,39 the auditory system might
be prone to hallucinatory experiences. Research showed
that during silence, the speech-sensitive auditory cortex is
characterized by intermittent episodes of significantly in-
creased activity in a large proportion of people. Some
cases showed more than 30% increase. Bilateral increases
in activity were associated with spontaneous activation in
the left primary and association auditory cortices and
ACC. This suggests that the endogenous activity is mod-
ulated by the ACC, resulting in spontaneous activation
during silence. This also explains why the auditory system
is prone to AVHs during silence.40
Cognitive Processes in Psychosis
Early Models of Psychosis
Weakening of Stored Memories. Hemsley and cow-
orkers41,42 presented an experimental psychological
model for psychosis. They considered psychosis to be
a weakening of the influence of stored memories of
regularities of previous input on current perception.
Fig. 2. The Network in AVHs.
Fig. 1. The Amygdala-Visceral and Hippocampus-Contextual
Networks in Delusions.
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Details against a meaningless background then charac-
terize perception. Continuity in perception over space
and time is disrupted, and also, the sense of self is
afflicted. The model predicts that schizophrenic patients
will perform differently on specific cognitive tasks, and
this has been found for,eg, prepulse inhibition.43 Deficits
in prepulse inhibition result in sensory flooding and can
be countered by antipsychotic medication.44 Hemsley
and coworkers3 never speculated about the brain areas
involved. Yet, the model resembles the disruption of
the perceptual process that is described by Kapur in bi-
ological concepts and is the result of a hyperdopaminergic
state in the mesolimbic pathways.
Monitoring of Willed Intentions. Another important
model has been proposed by Frith.45 This model can ex-
plain delusions of control and AVHs. A central monitor
compares actions to the expected results of that action.
In psychotic patients, intentions of will lead to actions
but these willed intentions are not monitored correctly.
This apparent discrepancy between will and action gives
rise to delusions of control and passivity. During delu-
sions of control, there is overactivation of the parietal
cortex because the movements are discrepant from expec-
tations. This might be due to lesions in corticocortical
connections.46
Theory of Mind. Patients with schizophrenia also have
trouble to mentalize the knowledge of another person.47
The mentalizing deficit can lead to many misunderstand-
ings in social functioning. The deficits of theory ofmind is
documented by evidence in schizophrenia, although the
extent of the deficits is relatively small and not always
present in schizophrenic patients.48–50 The brain regions
involved are the amygdala and the medial and inferior
prefrontal cortex (representation of the self),49 lateral in-
ferior frontal cortex (representation of actions and goals
of self and others),51 and superior temporal sulcus (rep-
resentation of the behavior of others).51
Perceptual Aberrations. Maher was the first to point to
perceptual aberrations in the development of psychosis.52
The patient tries to make sense of these aberrations by
reasoning, and in this way, delusions would develop as
explanations of the perceptual aberrations. Recently,
the importance of anomalous internal experiences in
the development of delusions was found once more.53
About 80% of the patients had delusions based on anom-
alous experiences. Only 16% of these patients could think
of an alternative explanation, while 30% of the patients
with delusions based on external events could do so. Al-
though normal reasoning processes play a role in the de-
velopment of the delusional explanation, there are also
reasoning biases. It is not a 1-stage process as Maher sug-
gested but a 2-stage process: perceptual aberrations and
reasoning biases lead to delusions.50
Cognitive Biases
Data-Gathering Bias. Jumping to conclusions charac-
terizes delusional subjects. This data-gathering bias
was found during a probabilistic reasoning task.54–56 De-
lusional subjects tend to jump to a conclusion and then
feel quite confident about the conclusion. The same
results have been found in normal people that score
high on delusional ideation.57,58 When the emotional
arousal is increased, the jumping to conclusions bias is
further exaggerated in schizophrenic patients.59
Attentional Bias. Selective attention and confirmatory
bias characterize paranoid patients who have a selective
attention for potentially threatening events. They contin-
uously scan the world for potential dangers and of course
will find many stimuli that signal potential threat.60 This
constant preoccupation with threat and threat-related
memories reinforces the paranoid convictions about
the world and conspiracy.51 Attention to threatening,
stimuli activates a network between the lateral inferior
frontal cortex (‘‘deep’’ levels of semantic meaning), ven-
tral striatum (egocentric memory), and ACC (motiva-
tional content of stimuli).51
Although potential threats are quickly spotted, the
paranoid patient spends less time on a secondary more
conscious appraisal.61 Jumping to conclusions relates to
a confirmatory bias. The patient is just collecting confir-
matory evidence for the danger but does not challenge the
evidence because this is considered as too dangerous. The
policy is, Better safe than sorry. Activation of the amyg-
dala biases attention to the perception of threat. This is
a fast preconscious process involved in the evaluation
of social meaning and the trustworthiness of another per-
son based on facial mimic. Overactivation of this area will
result in the perception of threat where none actually
exists based on the misinterpretation of the body state.
The dopamine excess increases the signal-to-noise ratio,
leading to heightened salience of threatening stimuli
and reduces the generation of alternative hypotheses
taking other environmental cues into account.62
Meta-CognitiveBias. Recent research has demonstrated
the importance of meta-cognition in AVHs.63–65 Patients
have an externalizing attributional style and strong beliefs
in the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts and pos-
itive beliefs on worrying. This bias is also found in hallu-
cination-prone normal subjects.66
Source-Monitoring Bias. Patients with AVHs have
a source-monitoring bias. Hallucinating patients make
more mistakes in identifying their own written
thoughts.67 A comparison between hallucinating and de-
lusional patients was made 1 week after a learning ses-
sion. They were confronted with answers to questions
that had been posed the week before. The patients had
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to decide whether the answer was an answer of their own,
of the experimenter, or a new answer. Hallucinating
patients tended to attribute their own answers to the ex-
perimenter.68 A replication of the study confirmed the at-
tribution bias and also showed that hallucinating patients
havemore confidence that their mistakes are actually cor-
rect answers.69 The bias is stronger for emotional words63
and when the attention is directed to the self.70 Recent
research compared several conditions: (1) saying words
aloud vs imagining speaking words, (2) listening to exper-
imenter vs imagining experimenter speaking, (3) imagin-
ing self speech vs imagining other speech, and (4) listening
to male voices vs listening to female voices. The study
reconfirmed the source-monitoring problem, but the
bias is not specific for internal and external sources.
Also the gender of the voice (both external) or imaging
self or other (both internal) showed mistakes.71 There
is also a bias in reading. Afterward, hallucinating patients
tend to remember silently read words as words that were
read aloud.72 People that score high on hallucination
proneness show the same source-monitoring bias as hal-
lucinating patients.73
These early models and cognitive biases have been in-
tegrated in a series of more multifaceted cognitive models
by Freeman, Garety, Beck, and others.54,74–80 These
models are now the leading models that guide therapists
in CBT with psychosis. We will continue with the effects
of both pharmacotherapy and CBT on symptoms.
Effects of Pharmacotherapy and Cognitive Therapy
Pharmacotherapy
Antipsychotic medications reduce the dopamine levels.
They do not eradicate symptoms but create a state of ‘‘de-
tachment’’ from them. This means that the patient is still
deluded but less preoccupied with the delusions and less
motivated to act on his delusions. These findings were al-
ready described in the first years of antipsychotic phar-
macotherapy. Chlorpromazine results in an apparent
indifference and affective neutrality, a decrease in initia-
tive and preoccupation without alteration in conscious
awareness or intellectual faculties.81 The dopamine
antagonists dampen aberrant as well as normal motiva-
tional salience. The effect of abolishing salience is very
rapid, but the recovery from delusions is slow because
psychological reappraisal is needed.4 Antipsychotic med-
ication does not affect the narrative delusional explana-
tions of the psychotic experiences in the past of the
patient. A paranoid patient was obsessed by noises in
the heating radiator (‘‘They move microphones through
the pipes to spy on me’’), salient objects in his house
(‘‘They must have moved it when they were in my
house’’), and noise in the television signal (‘‘They have
now switched to camera mode and look at me’’). After
taking antipsychotic medication, he reported after
a few weeks: ‘‘I have no longer heard noises, objects
were not moved, and I was not watched by the television.
I guess they have a short holiday.’’ The salient experien-
ces were now gone, but the secondary delusional expla-
nation of conspiracy was still present.
Cognitive Remediation
Only one study describes the effects of cognitive remedi-
ation training on the brain. Functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) was done during the 2-back test
that measures working memory.82 The authors found de-
creased activation in control group and increased activa-
tion in DLPFC in the trained group. This reflects an
improved working memory.
CBT and Pharmacotherapy
Similar Effects on the Brain. There are no research pub-
lications in psychosis, but we can learn from research in
anxiety disorders. CBT and drug treatment resulted in
similar changes in brain functioning in anxiety patients.
CBT and imipramine both showed reductions in over-
activation of rostral caudate nucleus in obsessive-
compulsive disorder patients.83 CBT and citalopram
both normalized frontal metabolism in social phobia.84
Also in spider phobia, CBT normalized the frontal me-
tabolism.85 These findings suggest that a psychotherapeu-
tic approach, such as CBT, has the potential to modify
the dysfunctional neural circuitry associated with anxiety
disorders. They further indicate that the changes made at
the mind level, within a psychotherapeutic context, are
able to functionally ‘‘rewire’’ the brain.
Differential Effects. In depression, CBT affects MPFC,
ACC, and hippocampus, while pharmacotherapy affects
limbic subcortical areas.86 Treatment response was asso-
ciated with significant metabolic changes in both treat-
ments. CBT starts at cognition and meaning and
works down to inhibit emotional circuits. Pharmacother-
apy directly influences neurotransmission that leads to
a secondary indifference toward the original delusions.
The direction of CBT is top-down, while pharmacother-
apy works bottom-up.
In a review, the authors conclude that this might also
be true for panic disorder. CBT affects PFC and hippo-
campus (top-down), while pharmacotherapy affects
amygdala, hypothalamus, and brain stem (bottom-up).87
Medications, particularly those that influence the seroto-
nin system, are hypothesized to desensitize the fear net-
work from the level of the amygdala through its projects
to the hypothalamus and the brain stem. Effective psy-
chosocial treatments may also reduce contextual fear
and cognitive misattributions at the level of the PFC
and hippocampus.
Pharmacotherapy and CBT are both able to rewire
and influence brain processes. However, they both
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have different points of action in the brain. Pharmaco-
therapy operates from the deeper and more central parts
of the brain that are involved in emotional processes,
while CBT operates at the level of the cortex and pro-
cessing of meaning. Pharmacotherapy has a bottom-up
direction, while CBT has a top-down direction. Pharma-
cotherapy restores neurotransmitter imbalance and in-
directly affects the strong emotions that accompany
psychotic symptoms. CBT helps to reinterpret symptoms
in a less harmful way and indirectly affects the strong
emotions that accompany psychotic symptoms.
CBT Changes Appraisal
CBT does not target neurotransmission. CBT in psycho-
sis acts directly on psychological processes. In particular,
it is most effective when the key appraisal, of inner mental
disturbance as externally caused, is reappraised as inner.
Both symptoms and the risk of relapse are thereby
reduced.74 Appraisal of stimuli is done in 2 circuits.88
The first one is extremely fast and runs from the eyes
to emotional appraisal and behavioral preparation to
fight or flight bypassing the visual cortex.89 The second-
ary appraisal is slow and more conscious and reappraises
the situation. When the appraisals differ, the slow pre-
frontal process is capable of inhibiting the fast subcortical
process.90–92
CBT helps to reappraise the anxiety-provoking stimuli
and can inhibit the visceral appraisal of anxiety. CBT
uses a top-down strategy in symptom control by targeting
the secondary delusions in AVHs. These secondary delu-
sions are about the identity and power of the voices.
When the patient can understand and acknowledge
that nobody else is involved in his voices and that he
does not have to obey the voices because their threats
cannot harm him, he can start to feel indifferent to his
voices. The involvement with the voices can then stop.
The patient does not fight nor does he pay attention
to the voices anymore. The patient can then become in-
volved in more meaningful and fulfilling daily activities
and regain purpose in life again. In paranoia, CBT targets
the cognitive biases such as selective attention and con-
firmatory bias and the style of jumping to conclusions
and tries to generate alternative explanations.
While pharmacotherapy reduces symptoms into remis-
sion, CBT fosters psychic recovery. This is an individual
process in which an individual patient overcomes the
personal disaster of his psychosis.93 Although symptoms
may stay, the patient finds a personal adaptation to the
symptoms and learns to compensate for restrictions
imposed by the disease, and at the same time, the patient
builds hope for a future. When recovery progresses, the
patient can again reintegrate in social life, find newmean-
ings and satisfying roles in society, even when symptoms
are still bothering every now and then.
fMRI can be used to evaluate therapy effects in future.
In paranoid patients, belief often overrules logical and
rational thinking. This ‘‘Better safe than sorry’’ policy
is characterized by activation of the ventral-medial
PFC.94 In successful therapy, this activation will be
replaced by activation of the right lateral PFC to inhibit
responses associated with belief in order to reach the
correct solution to a logical reasoning task.
A 4-Component Neuropsychiatric Model
This model contains the comprehensive cognitive model
of psychosis as described before and is taken one step fur-
ther by connecting the model to the biology of psychosis.
We have shown that many brain regions are involved in
psychosis and in anxiety in paranoid states. The basic
biological dysregulation in psychosis is the hyperdopami-
nergic state in the mesolimbic pathways. This first
component in the model alters the salience of percepts,
weakens the influence of memories, and prompts the pro-
cess of anomalous perceptions and hallucinations. This
bottom-up biological process also has repercussions on
a mind level. Experiences become extremely salient and
also thoughts can be racing, intrusions occur more often,
and thoughts are experienced with high salience and feel-
ings of personal significance. The process that produces
primary psychotic experiences is followed by an attempt
to understand what is going on.
The second component is the top-down process of nor-
mal thinking, reasoning and testing, to explain the aber-
rant experiences in a meaningful way. A number of
cognitive biases disturb reasoning.
The third component is a mediating component con-
structed of cognitive biases. Patients in a delusional
mood tend to jump to conclusions without developing
and testing alternative explanations. The deficits in the-
ory of mind contribute to the social misunderstandings.
In patients with hallucinations, the source-monitoring
bias makes them attribute aberrant cognitive processes
and intrusive thoughts to an external origin. Selective at-
tention is important in the development of paranoia but
also in its consolidation. Once psychosis has started and
secondary delusions have been developed in an attempt
to understand the salient experiences and the aberrant
perceptions, partly due to cognitive and reasoning biases,
the consolidating processes set in.
The fourth component is formed by the processes that
consolidate the delusions and secondary delusional
beliefs on the origin and meaning of voices. First, there
is the selective attention and confirmatory bias51,76 as a re-
sult of overactivity in the amygdala and hippocampus
and underactivation in the PFC. As in anxiety disorders,
the expectation of threat leads to an alarmed reaction and
safety behaviors in many instances. The avoidance of
possible threat prevents corrective experiences, where
patients can learn that the alarm was false. The overin-
volvement in voices by indulging or fighting voices fur-
ther strengthens the thoughts and circuits involved in
S118
A Neuropsychiatric Model of Psychosis
 at Vrije Universiteit - Library on November 29, 2010
schizophreniabulletin.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
psychosis, and a separate world and identity will develop.
Self-stigmatization and perceived stigmatization harms
self-esteem.95 Patients do not talk much about their expe-
riences and beliefs about their weakness. Sometimes, the
conviction of implicit badness make them helpless and
depressed.96 Another factor attributing to the entrap-
ment in psychosis is the negative appraisal of cognitive
functioning. Meta-cognitive beliefs about the danger
and uncontrollability of ones’ thought processes set up
to eagerly wanting to control ones own mind, an impos-
sible task that will lead to more thoughts that are intru-
sive. A lack of cognitive confidence and superstitious
beliefs lead to the expectations of punishment and
responsibility.64 In general, detrimental meta-cognition
within the narratives of persons with schizophrenia are
linked with symptoms, quality of life, neurocognition,
and poorer awareness of illness.97
A New Look on Symptom Remission
and Psychic Recovery
The 4-component model brings a new look on remission
and recovery. Many patients reach remission of florid
symptoms with the aid of antipsychotic medications.
The salient experiences are dampened, and the world
becomes more predictable and less harmful. The content
of the cognitive secondary delusional explanations of
past incidents are not affected by the antipsychotic agent
itself and have to be corrected by reflecting on the nature
of their experiences, conversations with others, and
reconsidering alternative explanations. The dampening
of salience facilitates reappraisal of symptoms and past
events, but not all patients resolve their delusional expla-
nation (‘‘Nobody is following me anymore. I guess that
all secret agents have been called back to Israel because of
the intifada.’’). A future dysregulation of dopamine will
result in an easy relapse in these cases because the delu-
sional schemes and explanations need little reinforcement
to be reinstalled again. In these patients, CBT could
change the delusional explanations and prevent a future
relapse in the identical delusional psychosis.
In other patients who continue to hear voices in spite of
adequate antipsychotic therapy, psychic recovery is still
possible in some cases. For instance, when a patient can
change the appraisals of voices from powerful and dan-
gerous external intelligences to annoying but innocent
psychic experiences of internal origin that have no power
over him, then that patient can control emotional arousal
and spend time and attention to other more useful daily
activities. As in themovie ‘‘A beautiful mind,’’ the patient
is no longer terrorized by his hallucinations and can in-
volve in more social and vocational activities. In these
patients, one could speak of psychic recovery without
symptom remission.
Full remission and recovery by the combination of
pharmacotherapy and CBT has not been subject to re-
search now but could potentially affect the chances of
relapse in a favorable way. A prospective trial can inves-
tigate the level of symptom remission and psychological
recovery in patients and their rates of relapse. Imaging
techniques can be applied to trials in which pharmaco-
therapy is compared with pharmacotherapy and CBT
to gain greater understanding of the mutual reinforce-
ment of both therapies.
Strength, Limitation, and Testability of the Model
An implicit weakness of the model is that it tries to incor-
porate 2 different paradigms into one model. Cognitive
processes are described in very different concepts and lev-
els of abstraction than are neurotransmitter dynamics
and brain areas. Although this endeavor might be impos-
sible, there is a growing need in the psychiatric field to
understand how these 2 approaches can reinforce each
other in the pursuit of recovering from psychosis.
Another drawback is that schizophrenia and psychosis
are such complex conditions. The cognitive models are
beginning to emerge, but the neurobiological models still
compete for more evidence. For this reason, the proposed
neuropsychiatric model is not a model for schizophrenia
but can only partly represent delusions and AVHs.
The model is largely overlapping with the psycholog-
ical models that have been published in recent years but
emphasizes the neurobiological component more pro-
nounced. This is the strength of the current model as it
can have a clinical and heuristic value in psychiatric prac-
tice. Patients accept to a certain degree that some expe-
riences just happen to them because of biological causes
but also consider their personal reactions to events as an
important factor. The clinician is helped by the model to
distinguish aspects of psychosis that are open to CBT and
those that are not. The same is true for the effects of
antipsychotic medications that target emotions and
aberrant perceptions but do not correct the narrative
explanations that patients have constructed cognitively
over a period of time to understand what is happening
to them. Sensitivity to both aspects of psychosis can
help the patient and therapist to overcome psychosis
more fully.
The evidence for the 4 components is quite extensive.
The dysregulation of dopamine has been central to psy-
chosis for decades. The psychological aspect of salient
perceptions of personal importance with high levels of
dopamine in the mesolimbic tract is connecting biology
with psychology. There is quite some evidence that the
process of explaining what is going on is influenced by
reasoning biases found in psychotic patients. The consol-
idation process is equal to the consolidation in many
other disorders. Avoidance behavior plays such a role
in paranoia and in anxiety disorders. The avoidance be-
havior prevents corrective experiences and preserves dys-
functional appraisals. The proposed model connects all
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these processes and also presumes a partial independence
of biological and psychological processes. This is still con-
troversial and needsmore research. It is clear that antipsy-
chotic medications take away the salience of perceptions
and reduce the drive to act on delusions and hallucina-
tions. It is unclear to what extend cognitive biases are
corrected by antipsychotic medications. The effects of an-
tipsychotic medications on cognition are positive, but the
effect sizes are small.98 The cognitive processes in that
meta-analysis were attention, memory, and executive
functions but not the specific biases reported to be in-
volved in psychosis. The data-gathering bias is most pro-
found in delusional subjects but does not stop with the
resolution of psychosis and is also found in some normal
subjects.58 Themonitoring bias in hallucinating patients is
improved with antipsychotic medications,99 but the mon-
itoring bias is also present in psychosis-prone healthy
subjects.100 The cognitive biases seem exaggerated by
psychosis but also persist independent of psychosis.
Although CBT can be effective in patients with antipsy-
chotic medications who still experience persistent AVHs,
the question remains whether CBT can be effective even
without antipsychotic medications. In all, 2 lines of re-
search can answer this question: experimental studies
and clinical studies. The experimental studies should fur-
ther investigate the extend in which cognitive biases are
the result of dopamine dysregulation and to what extend
they operate independently. The clinical studies have
compared CBT as an add-on therapy to antipsychotic
medication. A clinical designwould be a 23 2 design com-
paring antipsychotic medications or placebo with CBT or
standard care. While randomization over placebo might
raise ethical questions, researchers could start with a trial
comparing CBT to standard treatment in patients that re-
fuse to take antipsychotic medications at all. The trials
should not only look into therapeutics success but also
to the impact on cognitive biases.
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